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Introduction 
  During a May 2014 House Science, Space and Technology Committee hearing, Federal Aviation 
Administration and Federal Communications Commission officials and technical and legal experts from 
those organizations testified alongside U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, commander of 14th 
Air Force, and Air Force Space Command’s and U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Force Component 
Command for Space (JFCC Space).  These witnesses’ testimonies highlighted the difficulty of operating in 
unregulated, crowded critical orbits filled with dangerous debris and the ever present danger of collisions 
potentially making those orbits unusable.  Lt General Raymond also noted that JFCC Space “provides 
emergency warning of impending orbital collisions to all of the world’s spacefaring governments and 
companies, though it collaborates closely in space primarily with Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom."1  He also explained that JFCC Space maintains a catalogue of all known orbiting systems and 
debris.  As nations join the ranks of the space-faring, the number of trackable objects grows quickly and 
makes Lt General Raymond’s task more complex.  “All of the witnesses who testified at this committee 
meeting stated that the United States must improve domestic space traffic management (STM), and move 
quickly to foster international agreement on use of space.”2   Governments and organizations across the globe 
have expressed this same concern for many years now.  The European Union has produced “Rules of the 
Road” for space operations intended to be agreements between space-faring nations to mitigate debris and 
preserve the fragile environment above our atmosphere.  Even the late President Emeritus of the ICAO 
Council, Assad Kotaite, recommended a new annex to the Chicago Convention to extend ICAO 
responsibilities for producing International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for suborbital 
and orbital civil space flights. 3   His conclusion that the current SARPs should be expanded highlights the 
criticality of including tropospheric transition of  space-faring vehicles and commercial point-to-point 
suborbital transportation as considerations when developing new SARPs.  Although integration with 
tropospheric traffic has been studied for decades, the current operational environment has begun to bring 
previously disparate pieces of STM into a more focused concept.  With current global economic dependence 
on space capabilities and the ever-increasing international economic interdependence, all nations have an 
interest in maintaining access to space-based capabilities.  With strong U.S. leadership and support from 
other nations, a reasonable pathway to an ICAO role in STM is attainable. 
  
 What is STM? 
  Even after decades of substantive literature produced on the subject, any group 
eventually reverts to a consideration of
STM and Space and Air Traffic Management (SATM)
in May of 20014, described the overall concept 
vehicles into the National Airspace System (NAS).  
the overarching concept often include additional, critical aspects of space travel such as electro
interference (EMI) concerns and end-
Executive Branch communities have 
is still debate on the specifics, the most widely accepted definition 
of Astronautics, Cosmic Study on Spa
…the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into outer 
space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free of physical or 
radio-frequency interference.5
While concise, this definition covers an exceptionally broad array of 
flight of aerospace vehicles (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Four Phases of Space Flight
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  Each phase requires its own understanding of existing regulatory environments, fluid dynamics, Keplarian 
physics, Space Situational Awareness, international policy subtleties, and legislative finesse.  The complexity 
and number of disparate organizations involved helps explain why a STM concept would be best served if it 
evolved in a deliberate, phased approach along a similar path as current global air traffic management 
systems.  However, in order to make a final STM capability easier to realize, each step toward its 
development should be taken with the end state of a globally-standardized capability in mind.   
 
Why STM? 
  As technological advances make routine suborbital transportation realistic and space becomes more 
contested, congested and competitive, losing access to space-based capabilities becomes a critical concern to 
nations and individuals around the globe.  Space capabilities play a role in everything from buying gas to 
national defense.  Disruption in access to space-reliant services potentially range from minor inconveniences 
to catastrophic global economic collapse.  Though it is not that easy for the average global citizen to see the 
potential impact day-to-day, looking back at similar historical developments helps to clarify why the world 
needs STM. 
  Today any pilots that land aircraft at airports owned by any of the 191 member nations/organizations that 
subscribe to the ICAO SARPs understand the standard lighting, markings, navigation systems, phrases and 
single language used to ensure safety of those flights.  It is hard to imagine how much more difficult and 
dangerous international travel would be today without those standards.  The parallels between early 
aviation’s need for standardized air traffic management and today’s need for STM are easily discernable.  In 
the early days of aviation collisions between aircraft were very infrequent.  The “big sky” theory (low 
probability of running into one of the few other aircraft in a large area) protected airborne travelers for 
almost two decades.  As commercial aviation became more common place the network of airports, airways 
and air traffic control facilities grew to keep pace with the increased activity (Figure 2). 
 Figure 2: Growth of the National Airspace System
 A series of studies by the U.S. government led to the founding of the ICAO as a result of the Chicago 
Convention of 19448.  A tipping-point in the focus on air safety came after the 
between United Airlines and Trans World Airlines (TWA) passenger airliners in 
incident resulted in 128 fatalities and the destruction of both aircraft.  As tragic as this crash was, it 
fortunately precipitated recognition of an increasing danger to the public and the potential impact to the U.S. 
economy due to the rise in unregulated commercial air traffic.  The result was the Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, which created today’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and led to the most advanced and safest 
airspace system in the world9.   
  Just as this tragedy resulted in increased awareness of air traffic problems, recent events have prompted 
increased awareness of space traffic issues.  The February 2009 collision between the commercial Iridium 
and Russian Cosmos communications satellites was a similar wa
Although there was no loss of human life, this event highlighted the need for the 
consider how best to conduct safe and responsible operations in space and promote those practices 
internationally.  Similar to the 1956 mid
satellite collision may pose to the accessibility of the space domain, the resultant second
world economies, information systems, and national secu
world leaders. 
  After decades of progress the U.S. National Airspace System
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sustainability of the space domain. 
    The U.S. government officially recognized the increased activity in space in t
Security Space Strategy where it states that the “current and future strategic environment is driven by three 
trends – space is becoming increasingly 
in this analysis is the growth of the satellite catalog which the U.S. 
Surveillance Network (SSN) sensors around the world.  Figure 3 depicts the growth of the approximate 
number of unique catalog items being tacked from 1958 through 2010.    
 
Figure 3: Satellite Catalog Growth
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 summaries developed from these data will still need to be distributed appropriately outside of the Department 
of Defense13. 
  In addition to the increase in debris and new entrants to the commercial space market place, m
companies and governmental organizations wo
small, single function satellites better known as cubesats.  
relatively inexpensive satellites that have become more prevalent in recent years due to rapid increases in 
technology that allow owner/operators to launch a satellite with a single, specific mission and a short 
lifespan.  Although tracking these items is still possible, many don’t carry transponders of any type, so 
identification of individual systems becomes complicated.  In 2012, 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) catalog , but as launch and 
proposals are being made to deploy as many as 50 
population being made up of cubesats by 2017
  The number of actors operating outside Earth’s atmosp
nations in the recent past to over 60 nations and government consortia today.
entrants comes the increasing congestion in electromagnetic spectrums
communications transponders are expected to be in orbit by 2015.
Figure 4: Congested, Competitive and Contested
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   New technologies and commercial ventures continue to expand the frontier 
point suborbital travel a realistic possibility in the next decade.  The Federal Aviation Administration has 
been preparing for integration of suborbital flight transitions through the NAS
Operations for Commercial Space Transportation in the National Airspace System
their report titled Point-to-Point Commercial Transportation in the National Aviation System.
studies are useful in considering tropospheric deconflic
of the Department of Transportation’s purview
responsibility or capability in each area of space flight must be considered carefully before any plan
begins toward development of policies or procedures.  Figure 
that would be involved in consideration toward new policies and procedures required to develop
STM concept. 
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  The information presented in figure 5 could lead a reader to conclude the U.S. is has an existing, although 
incoherent, STM capability today.  The individual parts exist in disparate organizations scattered throughout 
the Executive Branch as well as in treaties and policies that loosely work together to provide protection for 
today’s volume of activity.   
  In addition to the immense technical hurdles involved in space operations, a U.S. owner/operator has to 
understand the requirements of each responsible organization in figure 5 and implications of their actions in 
relation to treaties to which the U.S. is a party.  There is no single point of contact within the U.S. 
government that consolidates this information or ensures compliance with all requirements prior to operation.  
An owner/operator is responsible for obtaining approvals and ensuring compliance where necessary, and 
developing their own methods of protecting their system in the unregulated aspects of operations where 
necessary.   
   As a safety precaution, many commercial owner/operators have agreements with U.S. Strategic Command 
that allow them to receive warnings of potential conjunctions.  In 2011 the JSpOC voluntarily made 4,331 
notifications to satellite owners/operators regarding potential conjunctions and based on these notifications 
owner/operators of space systems made 85 collision avoidance maneuvers.19   The conjunction notifications 
and resulting maneuver screenings have increased dramatically since the 2009 Iridium/Cosmos collision and 
this level of non U.S. Government owner/operator interaction was not originally intended to be part of the 
JSpOC mission.  10 US Code § 2274 has been added to allow the JSpOC to perform these functions but as 
this aspect of the JSpOC activity grows, the demand for resources to execute their traditional Title 10 
responsibilities competes directly with a non-mission requirement of maintaining safety and sustainability of 
the domain for commercial and non-U.S. Government owner/operators. Although the JSpOC Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) services represent only a portion of the overall U.S. STM activity (see figure 
6), the criticality of these services requires an entity whose sole focus is the operational safety and 
sustainability of vital benefits derived from operations in the space domain.   
 Figure 6: Current STM and Space Situational Awar
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to non-defense-related owner/operators.  The incoherent U.S. STM capability is finding new supporters who 
champion a new, focused STM “store front” with full knowledge that international participation is soon to 
follow. 
  Once a decision is made to pursue implementation, much of the previous work on the subject can be 
updated and used as a basis for a design.  However, in the near-term, resolution is needed regarding what 
entity will represent the “store front” to the rapidly growing population of owner/operators.  The two primary 
options that have risen to the forefront of discussions have been a lead federal agency and a commercial 
entity.  While a lead federal agency has its benefits, the ability to evolve quickly to meet the needs of a 
changing industry is seldom found in a governmental organization.  The more favorable entity would be one 
that can use the current technology to quickly adapt to needs of a persistently-changing domain.   
  A commercial entity with full support of the U.S. Government would be better able to exploit the emerging 
JSpOC Mission System (JMS) capability to quickly and efficiently transition non-traditional Title 10 
responsibilities from the Department of Defense while improving support to owner/operators to help ensure 
stability and sustainability of the space domain.  The ability to make tactical decisions and quickly fund and 
implement updates to existing capabilities will be critical in staying current with the ever-changing needs of 
the aerospace industry.  The Federal Aviation Administration has already dealt with this issue with 
supporting aviation when, in 2005, they chose Lockheed Martin to transition Flight Service Station 
responsibilities out of the federal agency’s purview21.  While Lockheed Martin serves as the interface 
between pilots for planning, the Federal Aviation Administration continues to regulate, inspect and meet 
their regulatory responsibilities while no longer being burdened by the bureaucracy required to maintain and 
operate this capability.  A similar construct would allow owner/operators of aerospace vehicles and satellite 
systems to interact with a “store front” organization through the four phases of flight listed in figure 1.   
 Once a decision has been made to pursue an STM capability using a commercial entity as a “store front”, an 
outline of a phased approach to implementation would resemble the outline in figure 7.  
 Figure 
  The first phase of implementation would consist of preparation for transitions of responsibilities.  This 
phase will require strong leadership in order to bring disparate
focus them all on one goal with a single set of objectives.  
upon, legislative changes could become necessary to enable what have been inherently governmental 
responsibilities to be adapted to fit a new construct.
begin to take shape with tools and data from existing organizations being used to establish the capabilities of 
the resulting entity. 
  Once established, manned and functional, responsibilities for preventing airspace conflicts between 
transitioning space traffic and existing aviation traffic would evolve fro
and re-entry of systems like the Space Shu
established on a case-by-case basis with coordination between the J
Administration.  As the number of launches and suborbital point
procedure will be required in order to minimize impact on both the aviation and space operators.  Figure 
highlights some of the potential legislative areas that could be impacted by these types of changes.
designations, right of way rules in the NAS
passenger carrier regulations all could be impacted
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  The second phase of implementation would begin with the transition of traditionally 
Defense-provided services such as conjunction assessment, collision avoidance, anomaly resolution and 
Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) 
responsibility or even the ability to comply with any direction provided by 
Most maneuvers decrease the lifespan of an orbital vehicle, which leaves an owner/operator being forced to 
decide between decreasing the time-on
coordinated effort between the owner
conjunction because no enforcement mechanism, and sometimes no compliance capability, exists
existing regulatory regime or accepted SARPs, even the 
based on JSpOC workload even if a current agreement is enforce between the owner/operator and U.S. 
Strategic Command.  New SARPs dealing with these and similar circumstances would 
changes or additions to Title 51 in order to operate a U.S.
Transportation Safety Board could also be drawn into investigating incidents involving U.S.
ing in the NAS.    End-of
 has Title 51 enforcement capability.  
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capable systems thus producing a need to adapt existing Title 49 regulations in order to ensure the U.S. has a 
designated agency to investigate space system incidents. 
  Phase 3 would include a collaboration between the JSpOC the new “store front”.  In phase 2 conjunction 
assessments are completed by the JSpOC and provided to the new organization for distribution.  In phase 3 
the new organization will begin to conduct conjunction predictions then produce and distribute conjunction 
summary messages to owner/operators.  Providing a non-governmental entity full access to the JSpOC 
catalog is problematic for national security reasons.  Enabling this new organization to develop methods of 
conducting and distributing conjunction summary messages is a possibility, but will require a great deal of 
additional effort once a new organization is established and is operating.  Distribution of the conjunction 
summary messages would also be improved through additional international agreements that could 
eventually evolve further into established SARPs. 
   However, just as current SARPs grew from U.S. leadership in aviation, the SARPs for STM will grow out 
of an effective U.S. example and confident U.S. leadership in implementing an overall concept intended to 
ensure a stable, safe space environment for future operations.  It has not been the U.S. that has taken the 
leadership role to this point, however.  The desire to preserve the space domain prompted the European 
Union to evolve their Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) into the International Code 
of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.22  Although the U.S. has agreed with the principles outlined in the 
European recommendation, their implementation methods potentially impeded U.S. national security 
measures and the effort has progressed very little despite years of effort from the European Union.   Other 
countries and commercial entities have also made strides in developing a STM capability, but none have 
been able to move into a deliberate planning stage. 
  Initially this impasse appears to suggest that developing a STM concept would prove very difficult.  
However, in reality it exposes this path to be a departure from the historically successful route, discussed 
earlier, by which aviation SARPs were developed.  A successful implementation strategy would parallel the 
course which resulted in current ICAO SARPs and participating country codification of those accepted 
practices.  This route also will require a U.S. leadership role given the preponderance of technical capability 
which resides in the U.S. Department of Defense for tracking orbital objects as well as the demonstrated U.S. 
capability in developing and issuing conjunction summary messages to commercial and foreign government 
owner/operators.  A stable, proven U.S.-based capability could easily serve as a basis, just as it has in the 
past, for a successful implementation of international standards that will help preserve access to space-based 
capabilities for people around the globe. 
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Conclusion 
  For decades, academic discussions regarding the concept of STM have led to a more well-understood idea 
of what near-term realistic technological advances and current orbital congestion require to ensure space-
based capabilities continue to be available.  Those theoretical concepts have become much more important in 
recent years as aerospace leaders and experts from around the world have begun to publically acknowledge 
an impending need for an effective STM capability and the expansion of ICAO aviation SARPs which 
address activities through and above traditional ICAO atmospheric strata.  While the U.S. Government has 
the preponderance of global STM-like technical capabilities, it is spread among disparate organizations and 
agencies with no single customer interface that is primarily responsible for safe passage to, through and from 
the space domain.  Strong U.S. leadership is required to expand current U.S. capabilities into a rules, 
verification and enforcement entity which can serve as a basis for ICAO involvement and a global STM 
capability.  A safe aerospace domain will help lower cost and foster growth of the involved industries, and 
help ensure continued availability of space-based capabilities to the global populous.  All of this must begin 
with the decision to move away from a hypothetical discussion and take the first step toward leading the way 
to a sustainable, effective STM capability. 
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